Going for Broke: Bank Reputation and the Performance of Opaque Securities

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: De Jong, Abe; Kooijmans, Tim; Koudijs, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Groningen; National Taiwan University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13503
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: underwriter reputation; MARKETS; CRISIS; debt; CONSEQUENCES; discipline; incentives; liability; beliefs; skin

摘要

Can banks' reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off-balance sheet securities, such as mortgage-backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West-Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High-reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long-run) reputational losses.