Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schwert, GW
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00865-C
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 153-192
• 关键词: Auctions; Insider trading; takeovers; PREMIUMS

摘要

This paper studies the relation between the premiums in takeover bids involving exchange-listed target firms from 1975-91 and the pre-announcement stock price runups. The evidence shows that the pre-bid runup and the post-announcement increase in the target's stock price (the 'markup') are generally uncorrelated. With little substitution between the runup and the markup, the runup is an added cost to the bidder. This finding has important implications for assessing the costs of insider trading. It also raises interesting questions about the role of information from public capital markets in private takeover negotiations.