Commercial banks in investment banking - Conflict of interest or certification role?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Puri, M
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00855-9
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 373-401
• 关键词: glass-steagall; banks; certification; Conflict of interest; Security pricing

摘要

When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.