Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, RC; Mansi, SA; Reeb, DM
• 署名单位: University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; American University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00067-9
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 263-285
• 关键词: ownership structure; Agency costs of debt; corporate governance; BLOCKHOLDERS

摘要

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and. debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.