The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nenova, T
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00069-2
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 325-351
• 关键词: Corporate control; voting premium; dual-class firms; takeover laws; Investor protection

摘要

This paper measures the value of corporate voting rights, specifically of the control block of votes, in a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, in 1997. A consistent measure across countries is proposed. The measure is adjusted for takeover probability, block-holding costs, and dividend and liquidity differences between the share classes. The value of controlblock votes varies widely across countries. It is close to half of firm market value in South Korea, and close to zero in Finland. The value of control-block votes is interpreted as a lower bound for actual private benefits of the controlling shareholder. The legal environment, law enforcement, investor protection, takeover regulations, and power-concentrating corporate charter provisions explain 68% of the cross-country variation in the value of control-block votes. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.