Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Johnson, S; Mitton, T
署名单位:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Brigham Young University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0304-405X
DOI:
10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00255-6
发表日期:
2003
页码:
351-382
关键词:
Capital controls political connections financial crises institutions
摘要:
The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated $60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms' estimated $5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.