Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Parrino, R; Sias, RW; Starks, LT
署名单位:
University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Washington State University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0304-405X
DOI:
10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00247-7
发表日期:
2003
页码:
3-46
关键词:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
institutional investors
ceo turnover
摘要:
We investigate whether institutional investors vote with their feet when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.