CEO reputation and stock-based compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milbourn, TT
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00066-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 233-262
• 关键词: ceo compensation; reputation; stock-based pay

摘要

I develop a theory of stock-based compensation contracts for the chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with recent CEO compensation data. The model characterizes the optimal contract for a CEO whose reputation evolves as signals of the executive's ability are observed by shareholders. Using various proxies for CEO reputation, I show a positive and economically meaningful relationship between stock-based pay-sensitivities and CEO reputation. The findings are robust to controls for CEO age, firm size, the dollar, variability of the stock returns, and industry effects. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.