Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Del Guercio, D; Dann, LY; Partch, MM
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00110-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 111-152
• 关键词: closed-end funds; Boards of directors; corporate governance; open-endings; REPURCHASES; rights offerings

摘要

We analyze whether board structure and director independence in closed-end investment companies are related to shareholder interests in ways that are consistent with boards being effective monitors. We report that funds with relatively low expense ratios, one measure of board effectiveness, have smaller boards, a higher proportion of board members who are legally considered independent, relatively low director compensation, and charter provisions that specify remedial action if discounts become large. Evidence from our analysis of major fund restructuring decisions, including share repurchases, open-ending proposals and right offerings, is largely consistent with the expense ratio analysis. Overall, board characteristics that we identify with effective board independence are associated with lower expense ratios and value-enhancing restructurings. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.