Crushed by a rational stampede: Strategic share dumping and shareholder insurrections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attari, M; Banerjee, S; Noe, TH
• 署名单位: Tulane University; Charles River Associates
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 181-222
• 关键词: Strategic trading; Ownership structure; corporate governance

摘要

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of institutional share dumping surrounding control events. Institutional investors sometimes dump shares, despite trading losses, in order to manipulate share prices and trigger activism by relationship investors. These institutional investors are motivated to trade not only by trading profits but also by a desire to protect the value of their inventory and to disguise the quality of their own information. Relationship investor profit from targeting firms both by improving firm performance and by generating private information. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.