Strategic alliances, equity stakes, and entry deterrence

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Mathews, RD
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.001
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 35-79
• 关键词: strategic alliances; COOPERATION; equity stakes; entry deterrence; Corporate venture capital

摘要

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm's incentive to enter one of its partner's markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry incentive, but accommodation is sometimes chosen to encourage entreprencurial effort on future growth options. I analyze stake sizes, block pricing, and welfare effects. The results have implications for equity alliances, corporate venture capital, and the organization of research activities. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.