Competition among regulators and credit market integration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dell'Ariccia, G; Marquez, R
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 401-430
• 关键词: Bank regulation; market integration; Regulatory competition

摘要

We analyze the incentives for independent bank regulators with financially integrated jurisdictions to form a regulatory union. Externalities lead competing regulators to choose suboptimally low standards. Centralized regulation, however, entails a loss of flexibility if equal standards must be applied across jurisdictions. We find that, first, centralized regulation will more likely emerge among relatively homogeneous jurisdictions/countries. Second, centralized regulation will be unanimously preferred to independence only if it entails standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Third, financial integration among more than two jurisdictions may prevent partial unions, which, in turn, may prevent more comprehensive agreements. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.