Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rauh, Joshua D.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 379-410
• 关键词: TAKEOVER; OWNERSHIP; pensions

摘要

If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.