CEO incentives and earnings management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergstresser, Daniel; Philippon, Thomas
• 署名单位: Harvard University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 511-529
• 关键词: earnings management; Stock options; ceo compensation

摘要

We provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO's potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In addition, during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options and CEOs and other insiders sell large quantities of shares. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.