CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Taylor, Lucian A.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 79-98
• 关键词: CEO; COMPENSATION; learning; DYNAMICS; bargaining; SMM

摘要

The level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears none of the negative surplus from bad news, implying CEOs have downward rigid pay. These estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and do not appear to be driven by weak governance. Risk-averse CEOs accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.