How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C. Y.
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 627-641
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Staggered board; Takeover defense; Antitakeover provision; Proxy fight; Tobin's; Firm value; Agency cost; DELAWARE; Chancery Court; Airgas

摘要

The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by presenting empirical evidence consistent with the market viewing SBs as leading to lower firm value for the affected firms. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.