Are there too many safe securities? Securitization and the incentives for information production

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hanson, Samuel G.; Sunderam, Adi
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 565-584
• 关键词: Securitization; Information production; Safe assets; CRISIS

摘要

We present a model that helps explain several past collapses of securitization markets. Originators issue too many informationally insensitive securities in good times, blunting investor incentives to become informed. The resulting endogenous scarcity of informed investors exacerbates primary market collapses in bad times. Inefficiency arises because informed investors are a public good from the perspective of originators. All originators benefit from the presence of additional informed investors in bad times, but each originator minimizes his reliance on costly informed capital in good times by issuing safe securities. Our model suggests regulations that limit the issuance of safe securities in good times. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.