Sharing information in the credit market: Contract-level evidence from US firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doblas-Madrid, Antonio; Minetti, Raoul
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 198-223
• 关键词: information asymmetries; Credit contracts; Credit bureaus

摘要

We investigate the impact of lenders' information sharing on firms' performance in the credit market using rich contract-level data from a U.S. credit bureau. The staggered entry of lenders into the bureau offers a natural experiment to identify the effect of lenders' improved access to information. Consistent with the predictions of Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000) and Pagano and Jappelli (1993), we find that information sharing reduces contract delinquencies and defaults, especially when firms are informationally opaque. The results also reveal that information sharing does not reduce the use of guarantees, that is, it may not loosen lending standards. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.