Entrusted loans: A close look at China's shadow banking system

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allen, Franklin; Qian, Yiming; Tu, Guoqian; Yu, Frank
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; University of Iowa; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; China Europe International Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.01.006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 18-41
• 关键词: Shadow banking; Entrusted loans; Credit shortage; Fundamental risk; Informational risk

摘要

We perform transaction-level analyses of entrusted loans, one of the largest components of shadow banking in China. Entrusted loans involve firms with privileged access to cheap capital channeling funds to less privileged firms, and the increase when credit is tight. Nonaffiliated loans have much higher interest rates than both affiliated loans and official bank loans, and they largely flow into real estate. The pricing of entrusted loans, especially of nonaffiliated loans, incorporates fundamental and informational risks. Stock market reactions suggest that both affiliated and nonaffiliated loans are fairly compensated investments. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.