How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorbenko, Alexander S.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 88-117
• 关键词: Mergers and acquisitions; Takeover auctions; Strategic bidders; Financial bidders; Takeover premiums

摘要

Differences among bidder type-specific outcomes of asset sales are theoretically related to differences in bidders' valuations and participation. The lead application to quantify these relations is takeover auctions: bidders are classified into strategic and financial, and bids are available. I structurally estimate valuations from all bids. The positive difference in premiums between strategic and financial acquirers is driven by the difference in dispersions of valuations (e.g., strategic bidders' synergies are more dispersed) and the set of auction participants. The difference in average valuations is relatively unimportant. My approach can help explain outcomes of asset sales, even in settings with limited bidder data. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.