Public hedge funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Lin; Teo, Melvyn
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Fudan University; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.09.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 44-60
• 关键词: HEDGE FUNDS; Asset management; Initial public offering; AGENCY; Conflicts of interest

摘要

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.