Property rights institutions, foreign investment, and the valuation of multinational firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, Leming; Mihov, Atanas; Sanz, Leandro; Stoyanova, Detelina
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.03.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 214-235
• 关键词: Multinational corporations; Foreign direct investment; Property rights institutions; Investor protection; Firm valuation

摘要

We study the effect of property rights institutions in host countries, the institutions protecting investors from expropriation by host country agents, on the geographic structure and valuation of US multinational corporations (MNCs). We provide firm-level evidence that better property rights attract investment from MNCs. We disentangle the effects of the Stulz (2005) twin agency problems in the context of foreign direct investment and show that our results are not driven by legal institutions protecting investors from expropriation by corporate insiders. Further, we show that changes in the quality of property rights in locations where MNCs operate have material impact on MNCs' valuations. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.