Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gompers, Paul A.; Ishii, Joy; Metrick, Andrew
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp024
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1051
• 关键词: VOTING COMMON-STOCK; CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS; corporate governance; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; TAKEOVER DEFENSES; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; market value; SINGLE-CLASS; RIGHTS

摘要

We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower. (JEL G32, G34)