WHY ARE STABILIZATIONS DELAYED

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ALESINA, A; DRAZEN, A
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1991
• 页码: 1170-1188
• 关键词: policy; deficits; debt; equilibrium; reputation; REFORM

摘要

When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition, each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes.