THE MACROECONOMICS OF STRANGELOVE,DR

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: JOHN, AA; PECCHENINO, RA; SCHREFT, SL
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 43-62
• 关键词: NUCLEAR-WAR; equilibrium; fear

摘要

This paper examines the weapons-accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence / conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The demographic structure permits analysis of both within- and between-country intergenerational externalities caused by past weapons-accumulation decisions, as well as of intragenerational externalities from the adversary's current weapons accumulation. Zero accumulation is a possible equilibrium with both noncooperative and cooperative behavior. Countries may also accumulate weapons to the point where conflict initiation never occurs. Pareto-improving policies are generally available, but international cooperation need not be Pareto-improving. (JEL D62, D74, E21)