SYSTEMATIC-ERRORS AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL-SELECTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: WALDMAN, M
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 482-497
• 关键词: Repeated games; rationality; Heterogeneity; COOPERATION; equilibria; ECONOMICS; EVOLUTION; MODEL

摘要

This paper derives two main results. First, in a world where inheritance is sexual as opposed to asexual ''second-best'' adaptations can be evolutionarily stable. That is, the adaptation selected need not be the optimal solution to the evolutionary problem at hand. Second, I apply this result to show that natural selection provides a potential explanation for why in many settings humans commit errors that are systematic in nature.