How (not) to sell nuclear weapons

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B; Stacchetti, E
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 814-829
• 关键词: patent; DESIGN

摘要

We consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers. These situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity-dependent externality. We construct a revenue-maximizing auction Sor the seller We observe that: I) outside options and participation constraints are endogenous. 2) The seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object. 3) The seller is better-off by not selling at all (while obtaining some payments) if externalities are much larger than valuations.