Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, BJ; Kagel, JH; Lo, W; Gu, QL
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Dong Hwa University; Donghua University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 781-804
• 关键词: LIMIT PRICING GAME; signaling games; ratchet; equilibrium; MINISTRY; rewards

摘要

We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted in context, making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students. (JEL D23, D8, C92).