A theory of political transitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, D; Robinson, JA
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.4.938
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 938-963
• 关键词: income-distribution; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; land-reform; DEMOCRACY; INEQUALITY; MODEL; instability

摘要

We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by, the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially, disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity, cost is low, for example, during recessions. The threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may, not consolidate because it is redistributive, and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy, and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility.