Fundamentals, panics, and bank distress during the depression

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calomiris, CW; Mason, JR
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Drexel University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/000282803322655473
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1615-1647
• 关键词: great-depression; UNITED-STATES; FAILURE; reappraisal; contagion

摘要

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk. Local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre-1933 bank failures, even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact.