Bidder discounts and target premia in takeovers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jovanovic, B; Braguinsky, S
• 署名单位: New York University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/000282804322970698
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 46-56
• 关键词: TOBINS-Q; performance; PRODUCTIVITY; OWNERSHIP; mergers; gains

摘要

On news of a takeover, the sum of the stock market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.