Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Persson, T; Tabellini, G
• 署名单位: Stockholm University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/000282804322970689
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 25-45
• 关键词: COMPARATIVE POLITICS; propensity score

摘要

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections.