Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dal Bó, P
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1591-1604
• 关键词: prisoners-dilemma; rational cooperation; repeated play; BEHAVIOR; economists

摘要

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how the shadow of the future affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions.