The political economy of corporate governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pagano, M; Volpin, PF
• 署名单位: University of Naples Federico II; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825646
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1005-1030
• 关键词: convergence; OWNERSHIP; HISTORY

摘要

We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.