The evolution of managerial expertise: How corporate culture can run amok

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernhardt, D; Hughson, E; Kutsoati, E
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Tufts University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157669
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 195-221
• 关键词: AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; Herd behavior; DISCRIMINATION

摘要

This paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring. Individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate. Dynamically, when workers become managers, managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time, raising investment distortions and reducing output. If firms select managerial expertise strategically, efficient investments can be retrieved when (a) identifying whether workers' skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers, and (b) initial investment distortions are small. Otherwise, such strategic design worsens long-run outcomes. Finally, we determine when short-run affirmative action policies are effective.