Superstition and rational learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.630
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 630-651
• 关键词: self-confirming equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; EXTENSIVE-FORM; games; Consistency; induction; BACKWARD

摘要

We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an appeal by surviving in the river as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as appeal by surviving in the river, is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path.