Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bandiera, Oriana; Prat, Andrea; Valletti, Tommaso
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Imperial College London; University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1278
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1278-1308
• 关键词: corruption; ENFORCEMENT; procurement; incentives; CONTRACTS; Indonesia; Uganda; COSTS

摘要

s We propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker, whereas passive waste does not. We analyze purchases of standardized goods by Italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency. We find that: (i) some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods; (ii) differences are correlated with governance structure; (iii) the variation in prices is principally date to variation in passive rather than active waste; and (iv) passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste. (JEL H11, H57, H83)