Falsifiability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olszewski, Wojciech; Sandroni, Alvaro
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.788
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 788-818
• 关键词: MANIPULATABILITY; calibration; tests; games

摘要

We examine Popper's falsifiability within an economic model in which a tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory. Payments are contingent on the performance of the theory vis-a-vis data. We show that if experts are strategic, falsifiability has no power to distinguish scientific theories from worthless theories. The failure of falsification in screening informed and uninformed experts motivates questions on the broader concepts of refutation and verification. We demonstrate an asymmetry between the two concepts. Like falsification, verification contracts have no power to distinguish between informed and uninformed experts, but some refutation contracts are capable of screening experts. (JEL B41)