Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Harvard University; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.493
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 493-525
• 关键词: gift exchange; labor-market; fairness; COMPETITION; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts-which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions-cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)