Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huck, Steffen; Seltzer, Andrew J.; Wallace, Brian
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.819
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 819-843
• 关键词: fairness

摘要

This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relationship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multiperiod environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)