Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Maastricht University Medical Centre (MUMC); University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.556
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 556-590
• 关键词: self-selection; tournaments; incentives; fairness; RISK; RECIPROCITY; trust; COMPETITION; motivation; ECONOMICS

摘要

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting. (JEL C91, D81, D82, J16, J31)