The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Roy; Chen, Yan
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2562
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2562-2589
• 关键词: Coordination games; fairness; preferences; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS

摘要

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)