Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gorbenko, Alexander S.; Malenko, Andrey
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.5.1806
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1806-1841
• 关键词: common-value auctions; asymmetric information; contingent payments; takeovers; exchange; DESIGN; acquisitions; CONTRACTS; bids; returns

摘要

We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options. (JEL D44, D82, G10)