A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.469
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 469-503
• 关键词: DECISION-MAKING; prospect-theory; preferences; CHOICE; regret; LABOR; RISK; optimization; expectations; Consistency

摘要

We develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament. We predict that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point, responds negatively to her rival's effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population.