The Value of Information in the Court: Get it Right, Keep it Tight

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iaryczower, Matias; Shum, Matthew
• 署名单位: Princeton University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.202
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 202-237
• 关键词: unanimous jury verdicts; IDEOLOGICAL VALUES; Spatial model; SUPREME; deliberation; aggregation; preferences; ELECTIONS; decisions; votes

摘要

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.