Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3317
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 3317-3332
• 关键词: altruistic punishment; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COOPERATION; uncertainty; provision; EVOLUTION; games

摘要

This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset social costs of punishing.