The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Budish, Eric; Cantillon, Estelle
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2237
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2237-2271
• 关键词: college admissions; strategy-proof; MARKET

摘要

We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82, I23)