Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.60
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 60-93
• 关键词: Bank runs; inconsistency; DISCRETION; PRIVATE; rules; MODEL

摘要

The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision.