The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2897
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2897-2922
• 关键词: Terrorism; VIOLENCE

摘要

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An extremist, who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)