Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gine, Xavier; Goldberg, Jessica; Yang, Dean
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2923
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2923-2954
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; insurance

摘要

We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)